

Towards a Digital Payment System for the Constrained Internet of Things

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Motivation and Challenges

Motivation

- Common Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios will benefit from a payment infrastructure
- Most of the IoT devices will be heterogeneous, constrained in memory, CPU, energy etc.


Challenges

- Storage of coins or account balances conflicts with memory or privacy
- Resource-intensive cryptographic operations challenge constrained CPUs
- Low-power wireless networking limits packet sizes and data rate

Research Questions

- Can we achieve autonomous, privacy-preserving, and scalable payments in the constrained IoT? Which limits and trade-offs exist?

Common IoT Scenarios



Limits and Potentials of Payment Approaches


Requirements

- Autonomy for M2M-payments without human intervention
- Privacy to protect privacy-sensitive (meta-)data
- Low footprint to allow for resource-constrained devices

Comparison of Payment Approaches

Feature	Approach		
	Traditional	Cryptocurrencies	Our: E-Cash
Architecture	centralized	decentralized	(de-)centralized
Autonomy	✗	✓	✓
Privacy	✗	pseudonymity	payer
Resources	•	••••	••

GNU Taler, an E-Cash Candidate for the IoT




In a Nutshell

- Income transparency enabling regulatory compliance
- Payer anonymity via untraceable coins and unlinkable payments

Design of a Versatile IoT Implementation

- Our design considers high heterogeneity of IoT hardware by building on top of a general-purpose operating system providing hardware-agnostic APIs
- Our implementation is based on the backend-agnostic API for cryptographic operations in RIOT, leveraging hardware acceleration if available, with optional fallback to software




Design using a Concise Data Encoding


Goal: Minimize fragmentation over low-power networks

Idea: Combine suitable protocols and efficient data encoding

IoT Networking Stack



Comparison of GNU Taler Withdrawal Request Payloads



- CBOR(-packed) outperforms JSON and gzip, both in terms of resource requirements (memory, CPU, energy) and features

JSON, readable but verbose

```

JSON structural characters
0x5b7b22706c616e63686574223a223835485a3333...222c...7d2c
[{"planchet": "85HZ33...", ...},
0x7b22706c616e63686574223a224e4832575842...222c...5d
{"planchet": "NH2WXB...", ...}, ...]
crypto. info: 410 B
    
```

JSON+gzip, compressed but not streamable

```

0x78da9d93c9ae1e271085dfe55f7bc13c780774438b168849401...
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
    
```

CBOR, concise + streamable but not ASCII

```

CBOR major types with length encoding
0x84a568706c616e63686574 590100 41 63 f1 _
[{"planchet": h'4163F1...', ...},
0x 68706c616e63686574 590100 ac 45 ce _
{"planchet": h'AC45CE...', ...}, ...]
crypto. info: 256 B
    
```

CBOR-packed, less redundant

```

CBOR tags packing table with map keys
0x d871 82 d872 8568706c616e63686574 _
113([114(["planchet", ...]),
0x84c6 85590100 41 63 f1 _
[6([h'4163F1...', ...]),
map
values
0xc6 85590100 ac 45 ce _
6([h'AC45CE...', ...]), ...])
    
```